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Over recent years it is becoming clearer how 
corporate power has captured the State to the 
extent that the two have formed a symbiotic 
relationship in which government policy follows 
the interests of the corporates.
By Peter Lawrence
Capitalism has undergone many changes since it emerged as the dominant mode of 
production, although its basis has 
been the need to accumulate capital 
through maintaining the necessary 
rates of profit. The capitalism of small 
firms owned by individuals in a system 
economists mythologised as ‘perfect 
competition’ is now the capitalism of 
global financial corporates. This has 
been a slow but accelerating process 
starting from early in the 20th century 
with increasing monopolisation of 
production, and later services, within 
nation states and developing into a 
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concentration of enterprises across 
the globe. The process of what has 
been called ‘the financialisation of 
everything’ has produced an outcome 
in which financial corporates dominate 
the global economy. There was a short 
period of history during which the 
State exercised a degree of control over 
the activities of what used to be known 
as monopolies, then multinationals and 
now global corporations. However, the 
power of those global corporates is now 
such that they have effectively captured 
the State and the international financial 
institutions. Further concentration is 
likely. This in large part helps to explain 
why governments, especially radical 
ones which promise much, are unable 
to deliver.
This increasing concentration of 
control in the hands of very few global 
corporates is paralleled by increasing 
global inequality, not only between 
nations but also within them. This is 
driven by the dictates of the dominant 
financial institutions whose demand for 
a rate of profit that matches that which 
they can achieve through the trading of 
the financial instruments (‘products’) 
they issue, forces enterprises in the 
non-financial sector to squeeze wages 
and salaries of all but the top executives 
and worsen conditions of work.  This is 
the race to the bottom, where many 
areas of production migrate to where 
labour is cheapest and the labour force 
is unorganised or politically suppressed. 
Recent research has drawn attention 
to the way wealth is increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of the few 
to the extent that 1% of the world’s 
population owns approximately 50% 
of global wealth (Oxfam, 2016). Even 
within that 1%, there is a further 
concentration of wealth. In the US, 
for example, the wealth of the top 
0.1% is now almost equal to that of 
the bottom 90% (Saez and Zucman, 
2014), something that, according to 
the authors, has not occurred since the 
beginning of the last century. 
However, there are developments 
within the system that may make it 
unsustainable and lead to a new way 
of organising society and its production 
of goods and services. Marx’s argument 
that capitalism would sow the seeds of 
its own destruction was largely forgotten 
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in Russia and China. However the 
evolution of capitalism as a hegemonic 
global system, and especially the 
abundance and cheapening of so many 
goods and services together with the 
development of the ‘sharing economy’, 
has prompted a return to the notion of 
the evolutionary demise of capitalism 
(Mason, 2015).
This article draws together work on 
the concentration of capital, on the 
relationship between the State and 
Corporate Capital and on the future 
of capitalism; all of which demonstrate 
the possibilities of different futures, 
some less benign than others.  
Corporate concentration and control 
Capitalism is supposed to generate 
the most efficient outcomes in terms of 
minimising the costs of production and, 
given ‘normal’ profits, minimising the 
cost of consumption, thus maximising 
consumer welfare. This is achieved by 
a large number of firms in an industry 
competing with each other for market 
demand, seeking continually to drive 
costs down in order to maximise profits. 
However, as is by now well known, 
this neoclassical economic picture 
of capitalism probably never existed 
and certainly does not now. What we 
observe in all products and services 
is their production by a small and 
ever declining number of producers. 
A good example is illustrated by the 
chart below which shows that 10 
food companies own almost all the 
well known brands of processed food, 
many of which began their life as 
independent enterprises before the 
raft of mergers and acquisitions that 
produced these global conglomerates.
The process of concentration of 
capital continues and accelerates. In 
late 2016, global brewers SAB-Miller, 
an amalgamation of major South 
African and US brewers and a number 
of other small brewers around the 
world, merged with its main global 
rival, Anheuser-Busch InBev, itself an 
amalgamation of three major national 
brewers in Belgium, Brazil and the 
US, to form a global brewer with most 
of the household names in bottled 
and cask beer. Two of the major 
media companies in the US, Time 
Warner and AT&T have announced 
a plan to merge to create a giant 
corporation dominating US media 
and challenging that country’s famed 
anti-trust laws. This process of mergers 
and acquisitions has been operating 
throughout the history of capitalism 
and looks set to continue. This suggests 
a further corporate stranglehold leaving 
the small percentage at the top with 
even greater power than they already 
have.
A Swiss team of researchers (Vitali 
et al, 2011) constructed a global 
corporate network starting from 
a list of over 43,000 transnational 
corporations. They found that 737 top 
holders accumulate 80% of the control 
over the value of all TNCs, 40% of the 
control of this network of corporates 
was held by a group of 147 TNCs in the 
core, which had almost full control over 
itself, 75% of the core were financial 
intermediaries, 75% of the ownership 
of firms in the core remained in the 
hands of firms of the core itself; and 
finally, the top 50 (45 of which are 
financials) have 75% of the core. 
The leaders of these corporations 
along with senior politicians from 
both centre-left and right, both in 
government and opposition, can be 
found at the annual World Economic 
Forum (WEF) held in Davos in 
Switzerland and the Bilderberg 
Group which now seeks to be more 
transparent with a website that, like 
Davos, tells us who was there. At the 
last meetings of WEF at Davos, of the 
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top corporates mentioned above, 
over one-third were represented by 
executives at chairman or CEO and 
just below levels. The IMF and World 
Bank heads were there as were several 
prime ministers, presidents and royal 
heads of state as well as various security 
interests – private firms, academic 
bodies and defence ministries, as well 
as senior members of military forces 
and alliances. Bilderberg is a more 
restrained event with a much smaller 
number covering much of the same 
sets of interests. 
This is less a conspiracy to maintain 
the existing power relations than an 
exercise in solidifying the ‘groupthink’ 
of those who attend which effectively 
defines the limits of state power vis 
a vis the corporations. Given these 
relationships, it is hardly surprising 
that after the financial crisis of 2007-8, 
governments rescued the banks and 
other financial institutions and have 
effectively allowed them to continue as 
before by pursuing an economic policy 
of ‘quantitative easing’ which has 
allowed them to restore their capital 
base. As we shall see below, there are 
other ways in which these corporates 
ensure that their interests are protected 
at the political level.
The concentration of corporate 
power has accelerated a process of 
state capture which has itself aided the 
increasing corporate dominance of the 
system. The election of governments in 
the late 1970s and during the 1980s 
and after, which embraced the ideas 
of what has come to be called ‘neo-
liberalism’, has assisted this process in 
many different ways, not least through 
limiting the ability of trades unions to 
protect their members and managing 
to divide the working population 
into different and opposing camps. 
The neoliberal ideology has been 
promoted in academia and the media 
and this has ensured that corporate 
power effectively runs government 
policy. This policy has accelerated state 
capture not least by allowing a creeping 
privatisation of traditionally state-run 
activities, such as health, education, 
transport, power and prisons, generally 
by selling off state-owned assets, or 
though a system of the sub-contracting 
of government services to the private 
for profit sector, or the licensing of 
private for profit companies to run 
public services in competition with 
the state sector. This practice has 
permeated local authorities so that 
there is no part of the public sector that 
is not commercialised except for the 
army and the police services, and even 
there, the rise of the private security 
companies is beginning to invade that 
space.
The State and the Corporates 
The financial crisis and its resolution 
recalls Marx and Engel’s observation in 
1846:
With... the development of 
commerce and industry, individuals 
grew richer and richer while the 
state fell ever more deeply into debt. 
…It is therefore obvious that as soon 
as the bourgeoisie has accumulated 
money, the state has to beg from 
the bourgeoisie and in the end it 
is actually bought up by the latter. 
(Marx and Engels: 1998:382)
Substitute ‘financialisation’ for 
‘commerce and industry’ and ‘the 
banks’ for ‘individuals’, and this 
summarises neatly what happened 
after that banking crisis. This is not to 
say that individuals have not grown 
richer in the process, as noted above, 
giving rise to the widely held view that 
capitalism works for the 1%, or the 
0.1% and that the modern state follows 
suit. Indeed, in spite of the apparently 
more sophisticated analyses of the 
State which appeared in the 1970s and 
after, it would seem that rather than 
this institution being ‘autonomous’ and 
independent of class, it has developed 
to the condition where it conforms to 
that famous remark about the State in 
the Communist Manifesto: 
The executive of the modern 
state is nothing but a committee 
for managing the common affairs of 
the whole bourgeoisie. (Marx and 
Engels, 1962:36)
The Revolving Door
Over recent years it is becoming 
clearer how corporate power has 
captured the State to the extent that 
the two have formed a symbiotic 
relationship in which government 
policy follows the interests of the 
corporates. The revolving door which 
sees politicians join the boards of 
corporates and corporate directors or 
senior executives are recruited to the 
‘executive of the modern state’ is now 
well oiled and has led Transparency 
International to conclude about the UK 
that:
Surveys of public perceptions of 
the most corrupt sections of British 
public life revealed that a public 
official taking a job with a company 
that s/he was previously responsible 
for regulating was rated as potentially 
corrupt by 80% of respondents.
(Transparency International UK, 
2010)
Indeed a survey conducted by 
the UK polling company, YouGov, 
in January 2012 found that 69% of 
respondents agreed that it was ‘too 
easy for former ministers to get jobs 
that allow them to make improper 
use of their time in government’ 
(Transparency International UK, 2012). 
Indeed it is. Fourteen former ministers 
set themselves up as consultants in 
2010-11 compared with just one 
in 2005-06. One of those, a former 
Labour Defence Secretary, Geoff 
Hoon, has helicopter manufacturer 
Augusta Westland among his 
consultancy clients. In 2005, while 
Defence Secretary, he approved a 
£1 billion contract to this company, 
which was controversially declared a 
‘preferred bidder’ despite claims that 
other companies could have provided 
better value-for-money helicopters in a 
shorter time-frame. 
There are many examples of 
former ministers, civil servants and 
ambassadors going to well paid jobs 
or directorships in big banks or the 
corporates with interests in areas where 
former politicians might provide useful 
information from which the corporates 
might gain. In 2015, the former 
Health Secretary, Andrew Lansley, a 
newly elevated member of the House 
of Lords, and who actively worked 
towards the further privatisation of 
the National Health Service, took 
a job with a US consultancy firm 
working with healthcare clients. 
Lansley’s job is to advise corporate 
clients on healthcare reforms, as these 
clients become increasingly involved 
in bidding to run parts of the NHS 
(Syal and Hughes, 2015). In January 
2013, the former head of the UK tax 
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This is the race to  
the bottom, where 
many areas of 
production migrate 
to where labour 
is cheapest and 




authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) became an advisor to 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC)’s Committee 
on Financial Systems. Four months 
later the same man joined Deloitte’s, 
a global accountancy corporate to 
‘advise overseas governments on 
how to implement "effective tax 
regimes" (Neville, 2013). The Director 
General of Commissioning at the UK 
Department of Health (DH) became 
the Global Head of Healthcare at the 
accounting corporate, KPMG, taking 
him from responsibility for designing 
new ways of commissioning healthcare 
to preparing bids for DH contracts. His 
successor at the Department followed 
him to KPMG a year later.  KPMG won 
at least three contracts following these 
moves (BBC, 2011).
Some formers ministers are prepared 
to act more directly in gaining income 
to add to their substantial pension. Two 
former foreign ministers were secretly 
filmed offering their services for hire 
and naming their price. Although this 
was a newspaper ‘sting’, it still revealed 
that these politicians were for hire, 
after they ceased to be MPs, as long 
as everything remained confidential 
(Perraudin, 2015). 
The revolving door also sees people 
moving from the private sector to the 
civil service. It was reported that John 
Manzoni, the new chief executive of 
the civil service, would be ‘allowed 
to keep a £100,000-a-year position 
on the board of the drinks company 
SABMiller ….he takes his salary in 
company stock and holds shares worth 
more than £250,000 in the company’. 
The report continued: 
A government spokesman said: 
“The Cabinet Office is satisfied there 
is no conflict of interest”.
Manzoni left the private sector to 
become chief executive of the Major 
Projects Authority earlier in the same 
year and worked in the Cabinet Office 
with Lord Browne, who was his boss 
when both worked at BP. Browne is 
the government’s lead non-executive 
director and the chairman of Cuadrilla, 
the chief fracking company in the 
UK. He was one of six members of 
the appointment panel who chose 
Manzoni for the job (Mason and 
Campbell, 2014).
A more recent example of 
this revolving door is related to a 
government decision after a delay of 
years about which London airport 
should get an additional runway 
following the recommendation from 
the Airports Commission set up to 
look at the options. The chair of the 
commission, Sir Howard Davies, 
formerly the first head of the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority, is also on 
the board of the Prudential, where he 
chairs a committee on investment risk.2 
Prudential has spent £300m buying 
properties around Heathrow. Its asset 
management business, M&G bought 
in 2013 the Hilton hotel at Terminal 
5 for £21m and received planning 
permission to build a hotel close to 
the proposed third runway, and two 
years later bought more property 
close to Terminal 4. Davies also used 
to advise the GIC (Singapore), which 
owns 11.2% of Heathrow. Questions 
have been raised about the impartiality 
of the chair of the Commission given 
what appears to be a clear conflict of 
interest (Davies, 2015).3
There are many other examples 
of this close relationship between 
the supposedly independent civil 
service and the private sector (Wilks, 
2015). Most recently this practice 
affected the leadership contest in the 
opposition Labour Party. One of the 
candidates had worked for Pfizer, 
the global pharmaceutical corporate 
and played an important role in its 
lobbying activities for NHS contracts. 
This compromised whatever he had 
to say about reducing the role of the 
private sector in public health provision 
however strongly held his apparent left 
wing views appeared to be (Watt, Pegg 
and Weaver, 2016). 
The criticisms of the various cases 
of the ‘revolving door’ hinge on the 
notion of a ‘conflict of interest’, while 
the defence of such practices is usually 
that of vouching for the integrity of 
the person involved who is able to 
‘wear different hats’ and resolve any 
conflict of interest by shutting out other 
personal interests while pursuing the 
public interest. However, this apparent 
conflict could be looked at in another 
way. The revolving door is about 
ensuring that the commercial interest 
becomes the public interest and so 
then there is no conflict of interest.
The case of the UK is replicated 
in many other countries and groups 
of countries.  The European Union 
(EU), has drifted from offering the 
opportunity to have greater control 
and regulation over the activities of 
international corporates to being 
captured by the lobbying of global 
capital through the same revolving 
door as evidenced in the UK. The 
most infamous recent example is that 
of former EU president Jose Manuel 
Barroso, who on retirement from 
that post, joined Goldman Sachs 
(one of those 50 global corporates) 
as a non-executive chairman (Dolan, 
2016).  Former EU staff move from 
gamekeeping to poaching on a large 
scale as in the case of a former lobbyist 
for the coal industry who joined the EU 
staff as a coordinator of coal policy, a 
former MEP who was a supporter of 
carbon capture and storage, set up his 
own lobbying consultancy after he left 
the European Parliament, a consultancy 
that has as a client a firm that represents 
the major oil companies, keen on this 
technology because it safeguards their 
mineral production (Corporate Europe 
Observatory, 2015). 
The list of these connections is 
endless. Readers of The Thinker will 
recall an article on Democracy (Prior, 
2015) which referred to a series of 
alleged scandals involving European 
politicians in the context of corruption 
and the erosion of democracy. One of 
those mentioned is the former German 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder who 
while in office championed the Russian-
German pipeline. Out of office, he 
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became chairman of the board of the 
North-European Pipeline Company, 
majority owned by Gazprom, the 
giant Russian energy corporate, a post 
reportedly paying between €200,000 
and €1m a year, though Schröder 
claimed those sums were exaggerated 
(Harding, 2005). These cases suggest 
that the power of the large corporates 
over states and state groupings through 
the use of the revolving door is getting 
stronger. The revolving door and the 
power of corporate lobbyists has been 
prevalent in the USA for decades4 
and some of the flavour of practice in 
that country is given in the following 
discussion of election funding. 
Election Funding
The funding of political parties, 
especially during election campaigns, 
has been subject to considerable 
scrutiny and criticism, not to mention 
accusations of the corruption of the 
political process. The US presidential 
campaign saw billions of dollars 
raised in funding for each candidate. 
Limitations on individual donations 
directly to political parties and 
candidates is now overshadowed by 
the donations to ‘super-PACS’ – the 
political action committees that are 
prohibited from having direct ties 
with politicians or their parties but are 
able to  support particular candidates 
through advertising in newspapers, 
on television and through electronic 
media. There is no limit on what they 
can spend but the money they raise 
has to be spent independently of the 
parties and candidates they support. 
Furthermore, although for-profit 
corporates are required to declare 
the source of their contributions to 
super-PACs, non-profit organisations 
do not have to do so. Donations from 
unknown sources, ‘dark money’, 
to non-profit organisations allow 
corporates to donate through the 
back door and thus swell the coffers 
of candidates and parties. Up to the 
middle of October, over $1.5 billion 
had been raised by the presidential 
candidates, of which a sixth came 
from super PACs (Bloomberg, 2016). 
Ironically given the result, Clinton 
raised twice as much as Trump 
overall, and three times as much 
from the super-PACs, which raises 
questions about the effectiveness of 
the expenditure of these sums (Open 
Secrets, 2016a).
Funding of candidates for Senate 
and the House of Representatives 
raises issues concerning the direct 
influence of legislation. For example, 
the largest donors by far to members 
of the Senate Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs Committee are from the 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
sector. Thanks to Wikileaks, we now 
know that an executive of Citigroup, 
one of the four big US banks, played 
a major role in advising newly elected 
President Obama on his staff and 
cabinet (Wall Street on Parade, 2016). 
Citigroup had to be rescued by the 
US government in 2008, and as in 
many other cases of banking failure 
through corrupt practices, nobody was 
prosecuted. One of the explanations 
that has been given for this is the 
large amount of funding for election 
campaigns. One insider who became 
a whistle blower and stood in the 
recent elections against a member 
of the above Senate Committee, has 
observed that:
“The banking and financial 
industry is the leading financial 
contributor in this election. Hands 
down. Banking has the most to 
lose,” said Stern in an interview. 
“So they are trying to buy as many 
politicians as possible. The banks are 
very smart. They know that if they 
get their voices heard in Washington 
and they buy the politicians they’ll 
be OK”. (Hill, 2016)
During 2015-16, the Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate sector 
contributed over $912 million to 
election funding, of which just over 
half went directly to the parties and 
candidates in the ratio of 58:42 to 
the Republicans and Democrats 
respectively. The other half went 
to ‘Outside Spending Groups’, the 
super-PACs (Open Secrets, 2016b). 
This is by no means the only explanation 
for the failure to prosecute banking 
and finance executives for the failures 
of their institutions, but it is quite a 
persuasive one. Other explanations 
are of course plausible. Proving intent 
to defraud is difficult, proving that 
sophisticated financial institutions 
that purchased the toxic assets did 
not know the risks and relied on the 
sellers’ honesty is also possibly difficult, 
and it is also possible that prosecuting 
senior executives would have further 
damaged the finance sector and 
therefore the economy. Having too 
much on their plate to investigate and 
ordering priorities to deal with cases 
that were easier to prosecute may also 
explain the senior executives’ escape 
(Rakoff, 2014). Whatever the case, 
that politicians can be bought adds 
to the general discontent with the 
political systems that allow this kind 
of influence to be exerted on elected 
representatives and the governments 
they support.
The Financial-Security Complex and 
the ‘Deep State’
The concentration of economic 
control in the hands of a small 
number of corporates, and especially 
financials, who appear to have the 
power to guide government policy in 
directions which suit their interests, 
together with the heightened levels 
of security concerns at home and 
abroad, has given rise to the concept 
of the financial-security assemblage, 
to complement the ‘military-industrial 
complex’, as the driving force of 
modern capitalism. This relatively 
new term in the academic literature 
embodies both the phenomena of the 
financialisation of the system and the 
increasing need for the securitisation of 
the system, not simply in its financial 
sense but also in the sense that global 
military and private security needs 
to expand to ensure that this process 
of financialisation is not disrupted, 
especially by ‘terrorist funding’. 
The effects of ensuring that informal 
money transfers worldwide, and 
especially by migrants sending money 
home, are not being used for funding 
terrorists, are to draw informal money 
transfer arrangements into the formal 
banking sector where they can be 
subject to security checks. (Gilbert et 
al, 2013). 
The growth in the surveillance 
activities of state security agencies 
and of military interventions in pursuit 
of terrorists or of regime change has 
occurred alongside the growth of 
private security enterprises, not only 
providing services for the movement 
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of money, the security of shopping 
malls, sports events and universities, 
but also working with the military 
forces involved in the various ‘wars 
on terror’. Private security is big 
global business with one of the best 
known corporations, G4S, operating 
in well over 100 countries, and in 
any one country, a major employer 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). 
Private security now outnumbers the 
traditional suppliers of personal and 
public security services, the police 
force, by ratios of between 2:1 and 
10:1 (Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2007).  
The research suggests that security 
against terrorism, security for the 
plutocracy that lives in gated mansions, 
and security for the financial institutions 
now underpins the dynamic of global 
capitalism in which the State is 
colonised by finance and the military 
and provides profitable activities 
for global finance capital.  Emerging 
too from these developments is the 
‘Deep State’.  The concept originated 
in Turkey under military rule and has 
more recently been broadly defined as 
representing:
….. the political interplay 
between unacknowledged or 
unrecognized factions inside and 
outside the regular government. 
The deep state is not an entirely 
monolithic entity that shadows the 
bureaucracy, military, or civil society. 
Rather it is an eclectic, ever-evolving 
political theatre of competition, 
one that includes elements both 
explicitly legal and outlaw in nature. 
Paramount to the operation and 
survival of the deep state is the 
extreme emphasis placed upon state 
secu¬rity, a need that places both 
law enforcement and clandestine 
agencies in the forefront of both the 
formulation and execution of state 
policies (Gingeras, 2011). 
The Future out of the Present5
The concentration of economic 
power and its capture of the State 
raises the question of where this is 
all leading and what is to be done to 
change the direction of travel. The 
increasing levels of inequality, the 
proliferation of low paid jobs and zero 
hours contracts alongside the huge 
senior executive salaries and bonuses, 
the pressure from the private sector to 
roll back the State’s ability to protect 
people at the lower end of the pay 
scale and maintain the quality of public 
services thus forcing a move to increase 
privatisation, have all resulted from 
the pursuit of the neoliberal political 
economic model over the last four 
decades. The 2007-8 financial crisis 
occurred in spite of the widespread 
belief among proponents of the system 
that such crises could never occur, and 
that the boom and bust of the system 
had seen its last as a consequence of 
the neoliberal revolution. The crisis 
has further exacerbated the condition 
of large proportions of the population 
in late capitalist societies but has 
not created the classic revolutionary 
conditions which accelerate the 
demise of the system and the rise of its 
successor, socialism.
The failure of social democratic 
parties to reverse this process, and their 
effective co-option by the corporate 
interests that have colonised the 
State, have fuelled the now abundant 
cynicism about governments’ ability to 
do anything about a system in which 
they have a vested interest. Lower 
voter turnout and voter rebellion as 
manifested in the UK vote to leave 
the EU and the election of a political 
outsider to the US presidency, 
accompanied by a shift to supporting 
populist parties, mainly of the right, but 
also of the left, recalls an earlier era of 
the 1920s and 1930s which ended in 
a world war. 
However, the capitalism of the early 
21st century is not the same as that of 
the 1930s and its development since 
1945 and especially after the micro-
electronics revolution has prompted 
the use of the concept of ‘post-
capitalism’ to describe the ways in 
which late capitalism is morphing into 
something else. Postcapitalists argue 
that the neoliberal model is effectively 
broken. The assumption that there can 
be a return to the model that was based 
on the growth of financial markets is a 
flawed one as the financial system is 
fragile and prone to further crises. In 
any case, the model prior to the crisis 
depended on private more than public 
borrowing financed by bank credit. 
Wage growth was suppressed except 
for those at the top of private and state 
enterprises and public bodies. The debt 
problem became a global one with 
creditor nations financing borrowers, 
China lending to the US and Germany 
to Greece being two examples of these 
debt relations. Most importantly the 
rapid development of information 
technology made many consumer and 
capital goods much cheaper. 
The financial crisis demonstrated 
that, contrary to the view of 19th century 
economic liberalism and 20th century 
neo-liberalism that markets allowed 
to operate freely would self-correct, 
they clearly did not. The response to 
the financial crisis and the subsequent 
increase in state expenditure to rescue 
the banks and mitigate the economic 
and social consequences of the crisis, 
was austerity, driving down wages so 
that at some point in the future they 
would match those of countries in 
the Far East as those countries’ wages 
rose. Mason refers to a report of a 
speech by the then CEO of Prudential, 
Tidjane Thiam, now CEO of Credit 
Suisse (no 14 in the list of those 50 
corporates listed above), in Davos 
in 2012. Thiam argued that ‘Unions 
are the ‘enemy of young people’ and 
the minimum wage is ‘a machine to 
destroy jobs’. Minimum wages made 
‘the workforce more precarious’ and 
reinforced the protectionist nature of 
trade unions which "represent people 
already in jobs so they always support 
minimum wages. That crowds out 
the unemployed. People can't get full 
time employment” (Mason, 2015:4). 
A liberated labour market would no 
doubt find market clearing wages 
where everyone would have a job, 
though what those wages would be is 
another matter. 
Postcapitalism is not socialism as 
in the classical Marxist trajectory in 
which capitalism sows the seeds of its 
own destruction and the proletariat 
effect a revolution, although the 
process postcapitalism theorists 
describe bears a strong resemblance 
to that Marxist trope. It may not 
lead to socialism, but it is beyond 
capitalism. However, it is a process 
which arises out of the contradictions 
of capitalism and contains the seeds 
of a new relationship between social 
relations and an economy dominated 
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by information technology. While 
capitalism’s persistent tendency to 
crisis, such as the financial one of 
2007-8, encourages the belief that the 
system is unsustainable, postcapitalists 
accept the system’s unsustainability 
because there is a disjunction between 
the changed social relations (no longer 
characterised by a capitalist class 
and an industrial proletariat) and the 
changed technological level (forces 
of production in Marxist terminology) 
which has created free goods, zero 
prices and zero work. 
Going beyond this critique 
postcapitalists  argue that that the 
latest technological developments are 
going to create an abundance of goods 
whose production costs tend to zero 
and whose prices tend to zero. Markets 
in the sense of institutions which fix a 
price that satisfies both producers and 
consumers, can no longer operate 
at zero price. Furthermore, markets 
cannot deal with climate change, nor 
with the current migrant and refugee 
crisis. Increasing automation now 
using robots is reducing the amount of 
work that needs to be done by human 
beings. Ironically, given the potential of 
IT, Mason argues that ‘instead of rapidly 
automating work out of existence, we 
are reduced to creating bullshit jobs 
on low pay, and many economies 
are stagnating’ (Mason, 2015:242). 
However,  information technology is 
also driving down marginal costs, and 
prices, towards zero and thus together 
with other non-market developments, 
‘corroding market mechanisms, eroding 
property rights and destroying the old 
relationship between wages, work and 
profit’ and ‘leading towards a post-
capitalist economy’ (Mason, 2015:112). 
As it is now well recognised, 
advanced capitalist economies have 
seen the decline in the relative 
importance of manufacturing as the 
economy of retail and financial services 
has rapidly developed. Financial 
services no longer simply provide credit 
to the other two sectors, but develop 
a life of their own with an array of 
financial ‘products’, some of which 
were a direct cause of the 2007-8 
crash. Automation, accelerated by 
developments in IT, has accentuated 
the decline in the relative position of 
manufacturing by reducing the size 
of the manufacturing labour force. 
The labour force in general is better 
educated and has seen the emergence 
of what Mason calls ‘the universal 
educated person’ who now works in 
networks, not factories.
The emergence of the ‘knowledge 
economy’ is another key development. 
A good part of it is free to access. 
Wikipedia operates on the basis that the 
information it contains is free to access 
and is produced (and corrected) for free 
by those with the knowledge. Free open 
source software can be improved by 
those who use it. Indeed it would seem 
that charging and thus restricting the use 
of this software makes it less valuable. IT 
software is now added to the content of 
physical goods thus reducing the costs of 
production towards zero and creating ‘a 
world of free stuff’ (Mason, 2015: 142). 
If this is really the way capitalism is 
developing in a way which will see it 
destroyed by the ‘world of free stuff’, 
then how do we get there? Mason 
schematises the following paths. First, 
we should and will engage in more 
collaborative work which would involve 
the creation of more cooperatives 
coordinated by an Office of the Non 
Market Economy, the socialisation or 
suppression of monopolies, the gradual 
disappearance of market forces, as the 
myth of the free market is exposed 
through its erosion, the socialisation 
of finance as it is returned to its 
original purposes of holding accounts 
and lending money, and last but not 
least, the institution of a basic income 
for everyone. To achieve all this it is 
necessary to ‘unleash the network’ 
(Mason, 2015:286): IT enables the 
production of an abundance of goods, 
everyone has a basic income which 
allows them to access these goods, 
while they contribute to society freely 
in exchange. 
The abundance of production 
and the sharing of consumption 
according to need and on the basis 
of the contribution to society being 
based on ability is of course not new 
and an outcome envisaged by Marx 
after the transition from socialism to 
communism. Mason has effectively 
updated this vision in the light of the 
possibilities which IT offers to make 
what appeared to be a Utopian fairy 
story into a reality for the future. A 
future in which work to earn the means 
of subsistence is no longer the central 
purpose of living is now possible. 
A combination of a universal basic 
income and the option of a reduction 
in working hours to zero would mean 
that people could choose how much 
work they wanted to do and the boring 
and mundane jobs could increasingly 
be done by robots.6 However the issue 
of exactly how this transition can occur 
and through which human agency 
remains. How are people to believe 
that society is moving in this direction 
and that they have to push it that way? 
If the agent of change is to be the State, 
as Mason suggests, then the State has 
to be liberated from the corporates and 
the famous 1%, or even 0.1% have to 
be liberated too, and not just of their 
wealth. Srnicek and Williams (2016) 
offer a more detailed discussion of 
who might be ‘the active agent of a 
post-work project’ (p.156). They opt 
for a populist movement organised 
around ‘an ecology of organisations’ 
(p.163) to counter the hegemonic 
common sense of neo-liberalism 
with a hegemonic common sense of 
a vision of a post-work society. The 
organisations could encompass political 
parties and campaigning organisations, 
local and national with the common 
vision of a post-work society given the 
unsustainability of capitalism as it now 
exists.7 
Another Future?
It is true that there are now radical 
left movements in western Europe 
such as  Syriza and Podemos as well 
as radical libertarian movements, 
who might shift popular opinion 
in the direction of the change that 
Mason believes is taking place. The 
parallel rise in Europe especially 
of right wing populism, including 
elements of fascism, is a challenge to 
this IT-inspired collaborative, dare 
one say, socialist future. Indeed this 
is a reminder that this is not the only 
direction that capitalism can take. 
There are an increasing number of 
examples of a ‘disordered future’ 
(Streeck, 2014). The current refugee 
crisis in Europe and the Middle East, 
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the EU crisis which is not simply about 
‘Brexit’, but about its very existence, 
the various political crises of around the 
world, the failure of the United Nations 
to become an institution of world 
governance, and now the breakdown 
of the various proposed free trade 
treaties which corporate power needs 
for its economic health but which 
also embody provisions which ensure 
it gains even more power.8 The era 
of growth which characterised the 
neoliberal renaissance of the late 20th 
century has given way to a decline in 
growth, even negative growth at some 
points, the increasing concentration of 
oligarchic power, and the rolling back 
and disempowerment of the State and 
its provision of public services. All of 
these aspects of capitalist disorder 
show no signs of being dealt with and 
looks like they might get a lot worse.
The Implications for Africa
Although this article has been 
concerned with State-Capital relations 
at the centres of late capitalism, 
readers will no doubt be asking what 
are the implications for the countries 
of Africa? The notion of state capture 
of states in the Global north will no 
doubt resonate with citizens of African 
countries who have witnessed similar 
connections between corporate capital 
and the State. The recent publication 
of a report on alleged links between a 
particular corporate and government 
ministers by South Africa’s Public 
Protector (Madonsela, 2016) raises 
issues not unfamiliar to citizens of many 
other countries, even if it only deals 
with one very public case, rather than 
the more pervasive issues of revolving 
doors and political connections. 
Perhaps the most significant 
revolving door in the case of African 
governments pursuing economic 
policies likely to aid corporate 
investment, is that between them and 
the International Financial Institutions 
(The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organisation). In 2012, it was found 
that 20 per cent of the Finance Ministers 
of the 47 African countries then aided 
by the World Bank, had previously 
worked for the Bank or the IMF (Bretton 
Woods Project, 2014), returning to 
their countries to implement policies 
that would promote the interests of 
the corporates – privatisation and the 
alienation of land for prospecting for 
minerals or for growing industrial or 
high value food crops (the ‘land grabs’). 
How far in African countries, corporate 
power and political connections 
have pushed policy in the interests of 
corporate capital, or how far this is a 
systemic consequence of neoliberalism 
will always be a matter of some debate 
and in any case requires research that 
goes beyond the scope of this article. 
Finally, in a postcapitalist world, 
the question of the place of the Global 
South in relation to the automated 
global North with zero process and 
zero work, is yet another question that 
needs more thought than yet given 
to it by the postcapitalists. Watch this 
space. 
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Endnotes
1 An outline of this paper was first presented at the 
Second European Blue Sky Conference: Global 
Transformations Consequences and Alternatives, 
Budapest, 29-31 October 2015. 
2 This is another example of the revolving door. After 
chairing the Airports Commission, Davies moved on to 
chair the Royal Bank of Scotland, technically state-owned 
after being bailed out in the financial crash of 2008.
3 Ironically, the one member of the Commission who was 
forced to resign because of a conflict of interest was the 
former chief executive of Manchester Airports Group, 
which owns the third London airport at Stansted, and 
which seems to have been out of the running very early 
on.
4 See for example the work in this area of Open Secrets: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/index.php.
5 The following account of postcapitalism and its future 
is heavily  based on: Mason, 2015; and Srnicek and 
Williams,2015, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and 
a world without work.
6 See Srnicek and Williams, especially pp 120-7
7 The reduction in the working week and the 
emancipation of people from ‘psychologically 
unproductive labour time within necessary labour time’ 
was part of the East German thinker, Rudolf Bahro’s 
vision of a different future. (Bahro, 1978).
8 The implications of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU  
for the  Economic Partnership Agreement with 16 
West African states are explored by Michael Prior in 
The Thinker (Prior, 2016)
